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INTRODUCTION
In order to prove liability, plaintiffs must link the failure of the Ryder
truck's hydraulic hose to Normandeau's death. Hanson's motion for summary judgment
argued plaintiffs' could not establish this link as a matter of law for two reasons: (1)
Hanson owed no duty to Normandeau; and (2) Hanson's repair was not the proximate
cause of Normandeau's death. Under plaintiffs' theory, however, any person who caused
a truck to break down would be liable to a tow truck driver who arrived at the scene to
tow the truck. Plaintiffs argue that no link between the repair and the forces that caused
the injury need to be established. Under plaintiffs' argument, it is sufficient to have
created the situation in which a tow truck is needed without any further causal link to the
injury that occurred.
In this case, for purposes of its motion, Hanson conceded that its repair of
the hydraulic hose was negligent. The failure of the hydraulic hose, however, was not the
cause of Normandeau's death. The facts relevant to what happened are undisputed.
Normandeau was killed while he was undoing bolts that secured the driveline to a Ryder
truck that had broken down. While Normandeau was preparing the truck for towing, the
driveline suddenly broke free due to torque that had built up in the truck's driveline.
Plaintiffs' expert testified that torque was created because the truck's parking brake
engaged.
Absent the design of the Ryder truck that caused the parking brake to
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engage when the hydraulic system lost pressure, the failure of a hydraulic hose would not
create torque in a truck's driveline. Torque is a known occurrence in trucks that break
down; the failure of a hydraulic hose, however, does not create torque in a driveline.
Rather, as plaintiffs' experts opined, it was the parking brake engaging, not the hydraulic
hose, that caused the build up of the substantial torque in the truck's driveline.
Plaintiffs' experts also testified that they had never seen such a substantial
build up of torque. In fact, plaintiffs produced evidence of another similar incident where
a tow truck driver was injured by torque in the driveline. In that case, like this one, the
tow truck driver indicated that he was not aware that torque could build up in the
driveline to such a substantial degree. In that other case, however, there was no evidence
that a hydraulic hose failed. In contrast, the truck broke down for a different reason, but
torque still built up to a substantial level. In both instances, no evidence indicated the
failure of a hydraulic hose created torque in the driveline. Instead, the torque occurred as
it frequently does when a truck breaks down, and in both cases, the design of the braking
system, according to plaintiffs' theory, exacerbated the amount of torque to a level
unforeseeable to experienced tow truck drivers.
In summary, what happened to cause Normandeau's death was not in
dispute - Normandeau was hit in the head by the driveline as he was undoing the bolts
that secure the driveline. Also, the cause of the force that killed Normandeau was not in
dispute - torque built up in the driveline causing it to whip as the bolts were removed.
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The dispute was over who was legally responsible for the accident. Plaintiffs continue to
assert that there are significant issues of fact; however, no genuine factual dispute exist
on the material facts necessary to resolve the issues of duty, proximate cause, and
contributory negligence that were presented in Hanson's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs had ample time to investigate and develop the evidence to
establish liability on the part of Hanson. In the end, the undisputed evidence did not
establish that Hanson owed Normandeau a legal duty of care or that Hanson was the
proximate cause of the accident. The trial court erred in failing to grant Hanson's motion
for summary judgment. Furthermore, the trial court erred in allowing plaintiffs to
untimely designate an expert witness in an attempt to create issues of fact. This case
should not have gone to the jury. In the end, the trial court's issued a series of rulings that
caused confusing and skewed evidence to be presented to the jury who returned a legally
unsupportable verdict.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING HANSON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE
ISSUES OF DUTY AND PROXIMATE CAUSE.
A.

Hanson Owed No Duty to Normandeau.

Assuming a negligent repair, a truck repair person owes no general duty of
care to tow truck drivers who arrive to tow the disabled vehicle. Whether a duty is owed
"requires a careful consideration of the consequences for the parties and society at large."
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Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986). "[W]hether the law
imposes a duty does not depend upon foreseeability alone. The likelihood of injury, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that
burden upon defendant, must also be taken into account." AMS Salt Indus.. Inc. v.
Magnesium Corp. of America. 942 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997).
Here, plaintiffs attempt to impose a limitless duty on repair persons,
regardless of whether the repair is causally linked to an injury. Hanson is not a guarantor
that the trucks it works on are properly designed. Furthermore, Hanson cannot ensure
subsequent repair persons properly perform their work. The law does not impose a duty
to such remote persons absent some causal connection. The mere furnishing of the
necessity of needing a repair person is not sufficient to impose a duty. See, e.g.. Carol
Lorane Bryant v. Glastetter. 32 Cal.App.4th 770, 782 (1995) (drunk driver owed no duty
to tow truck driver who was called to tow car after driver was arrested); Sanders v. PosiSeal Int'K 668 So. 2d 742, (La. Ct. App. 1996) (despite company's repairs to valve,
company did not owe duty to subsequent repairman who was injured while repairing
valve). The trial court erred in not granting Hanson's motion for summary judgment on
issue of whether Hanson owed Normandeau a duty as a matter of law.
R.

Hanson's Repair Was Not the Proximate Cause of the Injury.

The design of the truck's hydraulic system and/or Normandeau's negligent
failure to relieve the driveline torque before removing the bolts to secure the driveline are
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superceding causes which relieve Hanson of any liability for its repair. "Proximate cause
is fthat cause which, in natural and continuous sequence [] (unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the result not have occurred."1
Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (alterations in original and citations
omitted). Under this standard, plaintiffs had the burden of demonstrating that the
negligent repair of a hydraulic hose, without other factors outside of Hanson's control,
created the condition causing Normandeau's death.
Hanson's negligent repair of the Ryder truck created the condition of a truck
broken down on the side of the road that needed to be towed. Hanson did not create
torque, did not create the situation in which an experience tow truck driver could not
appreciate the dangers of the torque in the driveline, and did not train or cause
Normandeau to fail to check for or relieve built up torque in the truck's driveline.
"Demonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not
sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct
causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury." Mitchell v. Pearson
Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). "[I]f'there could be no reasonable
difference of opinion' on a determination of the facts 'in the usual sense' or an evaluative
application of the legal standard to the facts, then the decision is one of law for the trial
judge or for an appellate court." Harline. 912 P.2d at 439 (citation omitted). Also, "when
the facts are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established that determining causation
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becomes 'completely speculative,' the claim fails as a matter of law." Id.
Hansen is not asking this court to revive the rule in Hillyard v. Utah ByProducts. Co.. 263 P.2d 287 (1953), rather Hansen is asking this court to enforce a rule
that Utah courts have consistently followed. See Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246; Bansasine v.
Bodell. 927 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). When the more recent negligent or
criminal act was unforeseeable to the first negligent actor, the first actor may be relieved
of liability. See, e.g.. Bansasine. 927 P.2d at 677.
On each issue, plaintiffs attempt to hang their hats on issues of disputed
facts. Plaintiffs' argument, however, has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. See
Mitchell. 697 P.2d at 246. In Mitchell, a hotel guest was killed in his hotel room by an
unidentified assailant. The plaintiff argued the hotel breached its duty to provide
adequate security and this breach was the proximate cause of the guest's death. See id. at
245-46. In Mitchell, the Court determined that the hotel owed a duty and even that the
intervening criminal act was a foreseeable consequence of the breach of that duty to
provide adequate security. See id. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that plaintiff failed
to prove proximate cause because no direct evidence existed to establish a causal link.
See id. Significantly, because the victim was unable to testify as to what happened, the
Court noted that any number of possibilities existed as to how the death occurred - some
of which were not the result of the hotel's breach. Thus, the Court concluded any
proximate cause determination by a jury would be wholly speculative. See id.
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Similarly, in Bansasine. the Utah Court of Appeals specified that a
plaintiffs burden to establish a causal connection must include proof that a defendant
could reasonably foresee that its negligence would cause the general nature of the injury
that occurred. See Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 678. Under this standard, it is not the result of
the injury, i.e. death that must be foreseeable, but rather the injury itself, i.e. a severe head
injury from the driveline whipping into plaintiff. See id. (plaintiff must demonstrate that
it was foreseeable that rude driving would cause a gunshot wound). Thus, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that Hanson could reasonably foresee that its negligent repair of a hydraulic
hose would case a severe head injury from the build up of torque in the truck's driveline.
Like Mitchell all testimony regarding what Normandeau did or did not do
to check for torque was entirely speculative. Given that torque in the driveline was what
caused the driveline to whip, however, a reasonable inference existed that Normandeau
either failed to check for or failed to relieve torque in the driveline before he attempted to
undo the bolts securing the driveline. Moreover, because all tow truck drivers, including
Normandeau according to the testimony of his fellow employees and plaintiffs' own
expert, are aware of the possible presence of torque in a driveline, it is also reasonable to
infer that prudent tow truck drivers would check for and relieve torque before undoing the
bolts that secure the driveline. Although Hanson's repair may have precipitated the need
for a tow truck and brought Normandeau to the scene of the accident, Hanson did not
design the hydraulic system that created the torque, nor did it cause Normandeau to
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negligently fail to relieve the torque. The direct cause of the injury was the design of the
truck and/or Normandeau's own negligent actions. These circumstances cut off liability
for Hanson.
Normandeau failed to react as a reasonable professional would under the
circumstances in failing to appreciate the presence of torque in the driveline. Hanson did
not create the torque nor control Normandeau's reaction to it. Normandeau's negligent
conduct was an extraordinary reaction to the situation and was thus unforeseeable.
Hanson should not be held responsible for Normandeau's subsequent unforeseeable
intervening actions. Since Normandeau's negligent actions were an unforeseeable
consequence of Hanson's repair, Normandeau broke the chain of causation between
Hanson's repair and the injury. Thus, the design of the truck and Normandeau's
negligent actions were superceding causes sufficient to become the proximate cause of
the injury and relieve Hanson of liability for its repair.
II.

HANSON?S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRESENTED
ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW BECAUSE THE MATERIAL FACTS
WERE NOT IN DISPUTE.
Contrary to appellant's brief, the material facts surrounding Hanson's

motion for summary judgment were not in dispute, and the trial court erred in its
conclusions of law based on those material facts. Summary judgment is not precluded
simply whenever some facts remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is
genuinely controverted. See Heglar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah
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1980). On appeal, this Court should "determine only whether the trial court erred in
applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no
disputed issues of material fact." Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996)
(affirming grant of summary judgment on issue of proximate cause).
Plaintiffs argue on multiple points that the facts were in dispute and
therefore summary judgment was improper. (See PL's Brief at 19) Plaintiffs argue that
Hanson's negligence "caused a large, unseen, and dangerous amount of torque to build up
in the driveline." (See PL's Brief at 20). Plaintiffs mis-characterize the evidence in the
case. As discussed in the introduction, no testimony, including plaintiffs' own experts,
suggested the negligent repair of the hydraulic hose was the cause of torque in the truck's
driveline. All experts, including plaintiffs' experts, recognized that torque occurs
naturally when large trucks break down, and in this case the torque was caused by the
parking brake engaging, as it was designed to do.
Plaintiffs' own facts state: "As a result of the driveline parking brake
clamping down on the driveline when the hydraulic line failed, substantial unseen torque
was created in the driveline." (R. at 845, citing to Aff. of Rudolf Limpert at p. 4, ^[11)
Plaintiffs' expert notes that the parking brake engages automatically upon a drop in
hydraulic pressure "as an emergency measure to stop the truck." (R. at 808-09) Thus, in
plaintiffs' expert's own words, the cause of torque was not the failure of the hydraulic
line. Instead, the cause of the torque was the parking brake engaging as an emergency
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measure due to the design of the truck.
Accordingly, the hydraulic hose caused the Ryder truck to break down, but
the design of the truck caused the substantial unseen torque in the driveline. As the truck
was being prepared for towing, Normandeau attempted to drop the truck's driveline, at
which point the built up torque caused the driveline to whip as he was undoing the bolts
securing the driveline. The question was whether Normandeau was (1) the victim of a
dangerous situation that no tow truck driver would appreciate due to the unique design of
the Ryder truck's braking system, or (2) negligent in failing to check for and relieve the
built up torque before attempting to drop the truck's driveline. In either case, Hanson's
negligent repair was not the proximate cause of Normandeau's death.
Reviewing the record in this case, the material facts as to what occurred
were not in dispute. Instead, the application of the law to the undisputed facts was
contested. With respect to Hanson's statement of material facts in support of its motion
for summary judgment, plaintiffs did not dispute paragraphs 1-4, 5.d., 8, 10-18, or 22-26.
(R. at 831.) With respect to those facts that plaintiffs did dispute, the facts were either not
material or not genuinely disputed. Specifically, plaintiffs' dispute can be broken down
into two categories: (A) plaintiffs disputed any facts which suggested that Normandeau
had training or knowledge regarding the design or operation of the hydraulic braking
system in this model Ryder truck (R. at 831fl[5.a.), 833 fl|6), 838 fl|28)); and (B) plaintiffs
disputed any facts that suggested that Normandeau was either required to check for torque
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or did not check for torque before dropping the driveline (R. at 831 fl[5.b. & 5.c), 833
fl|7), 834 fl[19), 835 fl[20), 837 (1f2l)).1 As explained above and as set forth more fully
below, neither of these disputes are material to the issue of whether Hanson owed a duty
or was the proximate cause of Normandeau's death. Furthermore, with respect to
Normandeau's acts, plaintiffs had to rely on the affidavit of Jesse Enriquez in order to
establish that Normandeau followed proper towing procedures. (R. at 814) Despite the
importance of his testimony to plaintiffs1 theory of its case, Mr. Enriquez was never
designated or disclosed as an expert witness in this case.
^L

Whether Normandeau Failed to Appreciate the Dangers of the
Circumstances Does Not Make Hanson Liable.

Normandeau's lack of training as to this particular kind of braking system
and the dangers inherent in the braking system do not create a duty from Hanson to
Normandeau, and it does not establish a causal link between Hanson's repair and the
injuries. Hanson did not train Normandeau in preparing large trucks for towing, and
Hanson was not Normandeau's employer. Hanson did not design the braking system on
the Ryder truck and owed no duty to warn Normandeau of the inherent dangers of the
hydraulic system. Finally, Hanson's repair was not the proximate cause of the build up of
torque in the truck's driveline.

1

The remaining disputed paragraphs concern opinions as to who was liable for the
accident and are not material facts. (R. at 834 fl[9), 837 fl|27), 838flfl{28,29), 839 fl[30),
840(H31)).
11

Torque frequently builds up in a driveline when a large truck breaks down torque is not the byproduct of the failure of a hydraulic hose. Torque occurs in all trucks,
regardless of whether the truck has a hydraulic braking system like the Ryder truck. In
this case, plaintiffs1 experts have opined, without opposition, that the build up of torque
was substantial because the truck's parking brake engaged. Hanson did not repair the
truck's parking brake. Hanson did not design the truck so that the parking brake would
engage if a hydraulic line failed. In other words, Hanson did not create the circumstance
that caused the parking brake to engage - that was how ITEC designed its truck. Finally,
plaintiffs introduced no evidence to suggest that Hanson was aware of the design of the
truck or the inherent dangers posed by the truck's design. (R. at 831-851)
Plaintiffs argue that Normandeau could not have appreciated the dangerous
situation. Indeed, plaintiffs' opposition memorandum sets forth additional facts to
indicate that no tow truck driver would appreciate the potential build up of torque
generated by the design of the Ryder truck's braking system. (R. at 848-851). In fact,
plaintiffs cited to testimony that another tow truck driver had been injured by a similarly
designed truck and due to torque that had built up in the driveline. (R. at 848) In the other
instance of a tow truck driver being injured when the driveline whipped, the torque was
not created by a negligent repair of a hydraulic hose. In other words, the dangerous
situation was not a function of Hanson's negligent repair. Thus, the dangerous situation
was created by the design of the Ryder truck and the lack of knowledge in the towing
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industry about the peril created by the truckfs design. (R. at 848; see also R. at 814 (where
Jesse Enriquez testified that he was not aware of the dangerous situation and that the
Ryder truck was a "stick of dynamite")).
Plaintiffs argument then is that neither Normandeau nor any experienced
tow truck drivers could appreciate the dangerous condition created by the design of
ITECs hydraulic braking system. If the situation was not foreseeable to experienced tow
truck drivers with years of experience in dealing with torque and dropping a truck's
driveline, it would be equally unforeseeable to Hanson that a failed hydraulic hose would
put a tow truck driver in harm's way. Contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, Hanson did not
set a trap and then try to avoid liability. Hanson should not be held liable for a series of
events over which it had no control. The fact that Normandeau failed to appreciate the
dangers of the situation presented to him as a tow truck driver does not make Hanson the
proximate cause of his death.
R

If Normandeau Was Aware of Torque and Failed to Check for it. His
Own Negligence Was an Intervening Cause.

If the design of the Ryder truck was not an intervening cause, the only other
cause would be Normandeau's own negligence in either failing to check for torque, or in
failing to relieve the built up torque if he checked for it. Plaintiffs' own belatedly
designated towing expert stated that Normandeau was aware of torque in drivelines. (R. at
813) Furthermore, Normandeau's fellow employees testified that he had been trained in
how to check for torque and how to relieve torque if it was present. (R. at 620-21, 623)
13

Throughout this case, plaintiffs1 theory of the case has supported Hanson's
position that despite any conduct by Hanson that precipitated the chain of events,
Normandeau's own negligence was the proximate cause of his death. Plaintiffs have
asserted and continue to assert that experienced tow-truck drivers frequently drop a
truck's driveline prior to checking for torque. See Plaintiffs' brief at 21-22 and supporting
citations to the Record. Neither party has disputed that torque may build up in large
trucks when a truck breaks down, and in fact, plaintiffs' expert stated that Normandeau
was aware of the possibility of torque in a driveline. (R. at 813). Neither party has
disputed that the build up of torque in the driveline is potentially dangerous - hence the
need to check for torque. If the presence of torque was not potentially dangerous, a tow
truck driver would not need to check to see if it was present.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs continue to assert that Normandeau did nothing
wrong in dropping the disabled truck's driveline without first checking for torque.
Plaintiffs argue "[a]n experienced driver would not necessarily have checked for torque
before undoing the driveline" and Normandeau's method of removing the driveline was
"very, very common." PL's Brief at 21-22. In fact, plaintiffs have gone so far as to
suggest that there is no evidence that Normandeau had not checked for torque prior to
attempting to drop the truck's drive line. (R. at 831)
It was the torque in the driveline, however, that caused the driveline to whip
as Normandeau attempted to undo the driveline bolts. Thus, the evidence indicates that
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the proximate cause of Normandeau's death was one of two scenarios: Normandeau
either failed to check for or failed to relieve the torque in the driveline. Based on the
evidence, plaintiffs* theory is that it is not negligent for a tow truck driver to take a simple
step of checking for a known and common danger prior to dropping a driveline.
On the other hand, Hanson has argued a reasonably prudent tow-truck
driver would check for torque, alleviate the torque if it existed, and then drop the truck's
driveline to avoid possible injury. For this reason, Hanson timely and properly moved the
trial court for summary judgment that it owed no duty to Normandeau, was not the
proximate cause of Normandeaufs death, and was not liable because of Normandeau's
intervening negligence. Because the facts regarding the event itself are not in dispute, the
issues become a question of law.
Either the situation was the result of a design that created forces which no
tow truck driver could foresee, or the torque was a regularly occurring result of a truck
breaking down on the side of the road. If this is a case of a regular occurrence,
Normandeau was negligent in failing to check for and relieve torque in the truck's
driveline before he undid the driveline bolts. Because Hanson's repair had no causal
connection to why the injury occurred, Hanson's repair was not the proximate cause of
Normandeau's death. Normandeau failed to take known and reasonable steps to avoid
injury. Plaintiffs failed to produce any disputed material fact that would link Hanson's
repair with the injury that occurred, and the trial court erred by not granting Hanson's
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motion for summary judgment.
III.

HANSON PRESERVED ITS ARGUMENTS AND PROPERLY
APPEALED FROM THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF ITS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Under Utah law, this Court may review the issues raised in Hanson's motion

for summary judgment. At trial, Hanson had no opportunity to present questions of law
or the propriety of the trial court's decision to allow plaintiffs' untimely designation of an
expert to oppose Hanson's motion for summary judgment. As stated by the Tenth Circuit,
"Where a motion for summary judgment based on an issue of law is denied, appellate
review of the motion is proper even if the case proceeds to trial and the moving party fails
to make a subsequent Rule 50 motion." Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 56 F.3d 1226,
1229 (10th Circuit 1995). Plaintiffs rely on Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, TJ20, 144
P.3d 1147 to argue that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a reviewable
order on appeal after a trial on the merits. Reviewing Utah law, however, Hanson's
motion for summary judgment may be reviewed on appeal, where the issues present
questions of law and where Hanson had no ability to present the issues at trial.
When a party had an opportunity to present the same issues raised in a
partial summary judgment motion at trial, the interlocutory denial of the partial summary
judgment motion is not reviewable on appeal. See Wavment, at ffl[19-20. The Wavment
decision, however, cites to no other Utah law on this point, nor does it address what
issues were raised in the motion for partial summary judgment motion. Importantly, the
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Supreme Court held that issues that could not be addressed at trial may be appealed and
reviewed by an appellate court. See id. at f20. Utah law provides that Monce trial counsel
has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the
issue is preserved for appeal." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT
48,TJ14,48P.3d968.
In this matter, Hanson's motion requested the trial court to rule as a matter
of law on the following issues: (1) whether Hanson owed Normandeau a duty of care, (2)
whether its repair was the proximate cause of Normandeau's death, and (3) whether
Normandeau's own negligence was an intervening cause which cut off Hanson's liability.
Moreover, on appeal, Hanson argued that not only did the trial court err in its legal
conclusions on the above three issues, but it also committed a fourth error in allowing
plaintiffs to present an untimely designated expert affidavit to create issues of fact in
order to defeat Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Utah law unequivocally allows
review of an improper grounds for opposing a motion for summary judgment. See Brown
v. Jorgensen. 2006 UT App 168, Tffl9-22, 136 P.3d 1252 (reviewing denial of partial
summary judgment motion after trial on merits where part of the argument was to strike
improper affidavit used to oppose motion). As set forth below, Hanson was foreclosed
from presenting these legal issues at trial, and the trial court erred by allowing and
considering the affidavit of previously undisclosed expert witness in opposition to
Hanson's motion.
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A.

The Issue of Duty Is Always a Question of Law for the Court.

A pretrial ruling on the issue of whether a duty of care is owed is always
reviewable on appeal. With respect to the issue of whether a duty of care is owed,
"whether a duty of care is owed is 'entirely a question of law to be determined by the
court.'" Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ^8, 67 P.3d 1017 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). In determining whether a duty exists, the courts weigh a variety of
factors: ffA court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is ?an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is [or is
not] entitled to protection.'" Webb v. University of Utah. 2005 UT 80, ^[9, 125 P.3d 906.
The resolution of this legal conclusion is for the trial court alone to make, and its decision
requires it to address a number of competing issues and considerations which are not
presented to the jury during a trial on the merits. See, e.g.. Webb. 2005 UT 80 at \1
(discussing the intersection of tort law, governmental immunity doctrine, and special
relationship doctrine as determinative of whether duty exists); AMS Salt Ind., Inc. v.
Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315 (Utah 1997) (addressing reliance,
foreseeability, general common law, Utah law, and policy considerations in determining
whether duty existed as a matter of law). Because the trial court denied Hanson's motion
for summary judgment, the trial court necessarily concluded that Hanson owed
Normandeau a duty of care. Hanson was foreclosed from presenting whether a legal duty
existed at trial, and thus, the arguments were properly preserved and are properly before
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this Court on appeal. See Wayment 2006 UT 56 at |20.
Bj,

Proximate Cause/Contributory Negligence.

As presented by Hanson in its motion for summary judgment, the question
of proximate cause presented a question of law that is reviewable on appeal. Hanson
argued that as a matter of law, it was not the proximate cause of Normandeaufs death.
Although causation is typically a jury issue, "when the plaintiff cannot fshow that a jury
could conclude, without speculation,1 that the injury would not have occurred but for the
defendant's breach," then it presents a question of law. Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake
Bus. Dist, 2005 UT App 489, ^[14, 126 P.3d 781. Even on the question of causation,
where a motion for summary judgment presents the question as a legal issue rather than
for sufficiency of the evidence, the determination of the question is "manifestly a
question of law that the court must decide." See Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.. 56 F.3d
1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1995) (reviewing on appeal and after trial on the merits, defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the issue of causation).
In this case, Hanson's motion for summary judgement requested that the
trial court rule, as a matter of law, that Hanson's negligence was not the cause of
Normandeau's death. In fact, for purposes of the motion, Hanson conceded that its repair
was negligent, but that Hanson's negligence was not the cause of Normandeau's death.
Hanson argued alternatively that either ITEC's negligent design and/or Normandeau's
own negligence were the proximate cause of Normandeau's death.
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With respect to causation, Hanson set forth a detailed recitation of plaintiffs*
theory of the case in its opening brief. Plaintiffs have not disputed or argued that Hanson
has somehow mischaracterized plaintiffs' theory of the case. Similarly, plaintiffs did not
offer genuine disputes to Hanson's statement of material facts in support of its motion for
summary judgment.
In order to create an issue on the application of law to these facts, plaintiffs'
opposition memorandum cited to the affidavit of Jesse Enriquez, a previously undisclosed
towing expert. Plaintiffs' relied on Enriquez's affidavit to argue that Hanson was the
proximate cause and that Normandeau's acts were entirely proper and non-negligent.
Whether or not Enriquez's testimony should have been considered in opposition to
Hanson's motion could not have been presented at trial and is properly reviewed by this
Court after a trial on the merits. See Wayment 2006 UT 56 at f20; Brown, 2006 UT App
168 at TflJ 19-22. These are legal questions which the trial court was required to decide.
Moreover, the trial court's decision to allow Enriquez's belated affidavit is properly
reviewed by this Court. The fact that some of the issues went to the jury does not cut off
this Court's ability to review the trial court's legal determinations on Hanson's motion for
summary judgment and its decision to allow Enriquez's previously undisclosed testimony.
IV.

OTHER ISSUES ON APPEAL.
Hanson submits the other issues it raised in its opening brief based on the

arguments it made in its opening brief. After considering plaintiffs' opposition, Hanson
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has no additional arguments to add. Hanson does not want its silence on the additional
issues construed as a waiver or withdrawal of those issues on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, Hanson requests this Court to
reverse the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and remand for entry
of an order dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Hanson. In conjunction with reversing
the trial courtfs denial of Hanson's motion for summary judgment, Hanson requests this
Court to enforce the proposition that scheduling orders mean something and the deadlines
contained therein are enforceable. In the alternative, Hanson requests this Court to
remand for a new trial with instructions to correct the trial court's errors and abuses of its
discretion.
DATED this 5

day of May, 2007.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

.INDA A. MORGAN
[CHARY E. PETERSON
Attorneys for Defendant Hanson Equipment,
Inc.
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Tawni J. Sherman
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN
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36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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